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Summary
In 2004 and 2005, Afghanistan adopted a permanent constitution and elected a
president and a parliament.  The parliament is emerging as a significant force in Afghan
politics, as shown in debate over a new cabinet proposed in March 2006.  However,
insurgent violence continues to threaten Afghan stability.  See CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Conflict Political Transition
Afghanistan has not previously had a fully elected government, although there were
parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah, the last of which was in
1969.  Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution
were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by  a United Nations-sponsored
agreement of  major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on  December 5, 2001,
after the Taliban had fled  Kabul (“Bonn Agreement”).1  The Bonn meeting  formed an
interim administration, led by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun leader.  Subsequently, a
new constitution was approved at a “constitutional loya jirga,” or traditional Afghan
assembly in January 2004.  The constitution sets up a strong elected presidency, but, at
the urging of Karzai’s minority-dominated “Northern Alliance” faction, it gave substantial
powers to an elected parliament, such as veto power over cabinet  nominees.  The
constitution provided for the following.2
! Presidential elections (held by June 2004).  Two vice presidents run on
the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the
event of the president’s death.  They serve a five-year term, and
presidents are limited to two terms.  
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May 27, 2004. 
! A parliament of (1) a 249-seat lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of
People), to be elected simultaneously, if possible, with presidential
elections.  Of those, ten seats are reserved for Afghanistan’s Kuchis
(nomads); and (2) a 102-seat selected upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders).  Of the 102 seats:  34 are selected by  provincial
councils (one from each of the 34 provincial councils); another 34 are
selected by  nearly 400 district councils; and the final 34 are appointed
by the President.  The provincial and district councils were to be elected,
simultaneously, if possible, with the other elections.  No major roles are
stipulated for the provincial or district councils, although they are likely
to gain powers to impose local taxes and provide local services.
! In the lower house, at least 68 of those elected (two per province x 34
provinces) “should” be women, giving women about 25% of the seats.
The top two women vote-getters in each province earn seats.  In the
upper house, half of the president’s 34 appointees are to be women. 
! The constitution states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and
provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” and says that men and women
have “equal rights and duties before the law.”  Political parties can be
established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of
Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries.
! The constitution does not impose Islamic law but provides for court
rulings “in accord with [the Hanafi school of] Islamic law,” when there
is no specific provision in the Constitution or other laws on that issue.
The October 2004 Presidential Election
Karzai sought to hold presidential elections by the June 2004 deadline to
demonstrate that he did not seek to monopolize power.  However, there was an early
recognition that parliamentary, provincial, and district elections are complicated to
organize and could not be held simultaneous with presidential elections.  In July 2003, a
joint Afghan-U.N.  (U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA), elections
management body, called the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), was set up.
Even though a population census had never been taken, it was estimated that there would
be 10.5 million eligible voters.  The voting age is 18.  Registration was slowed by
violence in early 2004, and holding to the June 2004 schedule was judged not feasible,
but  a firm presidential election date was set for October 9, 2004.  The parliamentary,
provincial, and district elections were postponed (initially to April-May 2005).  A total
of 10.5 million voters registered,3 of which about 42% were women.  On May 25, 2004,
Karzai signed an election law 4 providing for  district-based (voting for specific
candidates) rather than proportional representation (voting for party slates). 
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In advance of the vote, Karzai engaged in substantial political bargaining to try to
blunt opposition.  Northern Alliance leaders, including former President Burhannuddin
Rabbani (the Alliance political leader) and Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, sought
to trade support for Karzai for a future role in a coalition cabinet.  Instead, Karzai chose
as his running mate Ahmad Zia Masud, brother of legendary slain Alliance commander
Ahmad Shah Masud, hoping to attract Tajik support.  His second running mate was
Hazara community (Shiite Muslims) leader Karim Khalili.  The Northern Alliance fielded
Education Minister Yunis Qanooni, who instantly became the most serious challenger.
Also running was Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who has been part of the Northern
Alliance.  Aside from the above, 15 other candidates were certified to run, including
Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq and Dr. Masooda Jalal, the only woman who ran.
To secure the vote, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),  the 37-nation
NATO-led peacekeeping force, was reinforced by 2,500 troops, bringing its total force to
9,000.  The U.S.-trained Afghan National Army (ANA), which had 15,000 at election
time and now has about 29,000, performed election security missions, along with the
Afghan national police (about 50,000 nationwide).  Several hundred additional U.S.
troops reinforced  the 18,000 U.S. forces already there.  On election day, there were a few
minor insurgent attacks during the voting — far fewer  than expected.  Voter turnout was
heavy at about 80% (8 million votes cast).  Fears of widespread voter intimidation by
factional militias were generally not realized.  The vote was observed by about 400
international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and other groups, who mostly rebuffed allegations by 15 challenging candidates
that there had been widespread fraud, including alleged failure of indelible ink to prevent
multiple voting.  International donors, including the United States, provided more than
$90 million in aid for the presidential elections.  An FY2004 supplemental appropriation
(H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106) provided $69 million for “elections and governance.”
Results.  Karzai was declared the winner on November 3, 2004.  He received about
4.4 million votes (55.4%),  more than the 50% needed to avoid a runoff.  Qanooni was
second with 1.3 million (16.3%); Mohaqiq, 935,000 (11.7%); Dostam,  800,000 (10%);
and Masooda Jalal, 91,000 (1.1%).  Karzai was sworn into a five-year term on December
7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney in attendance.  On December 23, 2004, he
announced a 27-seat cabinet that  tilted somewhat more than his previous administration
toward Pashtuns, particularly in the key security ministries.  Most notably, Fahim was
replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim Wardak, and Qanooni
was not given a cabinet seat.  To emphasize a commitment to counter- narcotics, Karzai
appointed a new Minister of Counter-Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi.
Parliamentary and Provincial Elections/New Parliament
On March 21, 2005, the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
announced that parliamentary and provincial elections would be held on September 18,
2005.  District elections were postponed until some time in 2006 (no date is yet
scheduled) because of the complexities of drawing district  boundaries.  This
postponement meant that these councils would not select their representatives to the upper
house (Meshrano Jirga).  In the interim, the 34 provincial councils would select two
representatives — one permanent (full four-year term) and one interim, with each interim
member to be replaced by a district council selectee when these councils are elected.  
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The election system was the “Single Non-Transferable Vote System” (SNTV) in
which candidates stand as individuals, not as members of  a  party list.  Each voter cast
a ballot for only one candidate for the lower house, even though there were multiple
representatives per province — the number varying from 2 (Panjsher province) to 33
(Kabul province).  Herat province has 17 representatives; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh,
and Ghazni, 11 seats each.  Each of the 34 provincial councils consists of between 9 and
29 seats (Kabul province is largest with 29).  Some experts had urged that the
parliamentary election be conducted by proportional representation because there would
be less potential for local manipulation.  That system was not adopted because of the fears
of  empowering political parties, which are unpopular in Afghanistan because of the
mujahedin parties’ links to foreign governments during the anti-Soviet war.  Even though
the vote was not party-based, 70 parties are registered with the Ministry of Justice.
There were a total of 2,815 candidates (including 347 women) for the lower house
and 3,185 candidates (including 279 women) for the provincial councils.  Out of
Afghanistan’s  34 provinces, three  (Nangahar, Uruzgan, and Zabol)  did not have enough
female candidates for the provincial elections to ensure at least 25% female
representation;  these seats remain vacant until the next election.  During June 25-July 21,
over 2 million additional voters registered (those who came of age since the presidential
election or were not originally counted), bringing the total to about 12.5 million.  The
OSCE and the European Union sent observer missions.  An Electoral Complaints
Commission (ECC) initially disqualified 208 candidates for alleged ties to illegal militias;
some disarmed, others withdrew their candidacies.  A final list of candidates was
published on July 12, with only 11 disqualified,  although another 28 were later
disqualified, mostly for alleged links to armed groups.  The September 2005 elections cost
about $159 million, all of which came from international donors.  The United States
contributed about $40 million (from FY2004 and FY2005 supplemental appropriations,
P.L. 108-106 and P.L. 109-13).
Prior to the election, observers feared that stepped up Taliban insurgent violence in
Afghanistan could disrupt the elections, even though Taliban “spokespersons” said
polling places would not be targeted.  Seven candidates and four election workers were
killed before the election (and one after).  Other experts perceived the main threat to the
election as local militia leaders and narcotics traffickers who might try to influence the
voting.  Security measures were similar to those put in place for the presidential elections;
the Afghan national police and the ANA  took the lead in guarding the 6,200 polling
centers, with U.S. and international forces ready to assist.  No major attacks on polling
centers were reported during the vote, although about 15 people were killed in election
day violence (including a French soldier).  However, turnout was lower than expected —
about 57%  (about 6.8 million voters), which observers tended to attribute to voter
confusion over the large numbers of candidates on each ballot and high voter illiteracy,
even though candidates were identified on the ballot with symbols and photographs.
Observers did express concerns about apparent fraud (mostly proxy voting in some
districts), and JEMB investigations of  balloting complaints delayed publication of final
results until November 12, 2005.5  
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Results and New Parliament.6  The results largely confirmed expectations that
many seats would go to prominent national and local personalities and factional
groupings.  Although Karzai himself did not form a party, observers say that Karzai
supporters are about 60% of the parliament.  Among the pro-Karzai parliamentarians is
his elder brother, Qayyum (Qandahar Province).  About 40 parliamentarians are from  the
Hizb-e-Islam party  of anti-U.S. former mujahedin leader  Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but they
have renounced violence and are said to support Karzai.  
An “opposition” bloc is the 14-party, pro-Northern Alliance “National
Understanding Front,”  led by Yunus Qanooni and former president Rabbani.  Qanooni,
who is believed to be positioning himself for another presidential run, won a lower house
seat from Kabul province and was selected lower house Speaker on December 21, 2005.
Both Qanooni and Rabbani say they want to work cooperatively with Karzai’s
government, but they appear to have assembled a formidable parliamentary bloc.  They
engineered Qanooni’s selection as speaker, beating back a challenge from Abd-i-Rab
Rasul Sayyaf (Kabul Province), a prominent mujahedin party leader and Islamic
conservative who was backed by Karzai for the speakership.  Two deputy lower house
speakers were selected on December 22:  the first deputy is Aref  Nurzai (a relative by
marriage to the Karzai clan); the other is Kawzia Kofi, a Tajik woman from Rabbani’s
home province (Badakhshan). 
Introducing  further texture to the parliament is the presence of reputed militia
leaders, former officials of the Communist regime that led Afghanistan during the Soviet
occupation, and  Taliban era figures who renounced violence.  The feared Soviet-era
Interior Minister, Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi, won a seat from Khost Province.
Shanawaz Tanai, the Soviet-era Defense Minister, was not elected.  Of the former Taliban
figures, Abdul Salam Rocketi (“Mullah Rocketi”), won from Zabol province, and
Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the Taliban rule and
who cooperated with the Taliban’s destruction of the large Buddha statues in Bamiyan in
early 2001, won from Samangan province.  Some accounts say that at least another six
elected members were Taliban officials or military commanders.  The Taliban-era
Foreign Minister Wakil Mutawwakil lost, as did the former enforcer of the Taliban’s
puritanical restrictions, Maulvi Qalamuddin.  Another  reputed militia leader who won a
seat is Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for directing  the Afghan
component of the assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt in the Tora Bora mountains during the
U.S.-led war.  Another elected member is Pacha Khan Zadran, a local leader from Paktia
Province who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora during
the U.S. offensive there.  However, a prevailing view in Kabul is that all faction leaders
are now committed to peaceful debate in parliament rather than violence. 
A number of unaffiliated, well-educated Afghans also won, including several
prominent women.  They include 27-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), an
outspoken women’s rights advocate who is emerging as a leading government critic in the
new parliament.  Other prominent women who won are  Fauzia Gailani, who came in first
in conservative Herat Province, and Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine.
One of the few intellectuals elected was Ramazan Bashardost, a male former Karzai
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government minister who is emerging as a major champion of constitutional procedure
and parliamentary prerogatives.  The U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI)
is working to organize and train the estimated 93 lower house “independents; “ the
National Democratic Institute (NDI) is assisting the larger, organized factions.  
In the upper house, Karzai has fewer critics.  After making his 34 appointments to
that body (including the mandated 17 women), he engineered the appointment of an ally,
Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (who heads a reconciliation and amnesty commission) as its
Speaker.  Mojadeddi defeated a university chancellor, Bakhtar Aminzay, for that post.
Karzai  also appointed Fahim (see above) to the body, representing a further effort to
coopt the Northern Alliance leaders; as well as reputed drug trafficker Sher Mohammad
Akhund, the governor of Helmand Province; and former Taliban religious affairs deputy
minister Arsala Rahmani.  The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, a generally pro-Karzai
family that has five members in the parliament (both houses).  
After a one-week training session, both houses were inaugurated on December 19,
with Vice President Cheney attending.  Assisting the members is a staff of  about 275
Afghans, reporting to a parliament “secretariat.”  Staff  was hired a year before parliament
convened, and they and the members are receiving assistance and training from the U.N.
Development Program and the State University of New York (SUNY) under an $8
million contract with USAID.  It has formed 18 committees to oversee governmental
functions; each committee has two staff members.  The parliament has a small research
group and a relatively small library.  The parliament’s budget is controlled by the
government (Ministry of Finance).
Parliament-Executive Relations and Implications.  The completion of the
series of  elections (with the exception of the district councils) is considered a major
milestone that has given the Afghan government additional strength and legitimacy.  On
the other hand, the new parliament has already begun to slow government decision-
making and cause Karzai to proceed somewhat more cautiously in his close relationship
with the United States.  Immediately after it was seated, parliament called for the
dismantling of  (mostly U.S.-run) “security barriers” in Kabul.  
Subsequently (February 2006), the Qanooni/Rabbani grouping achieved a parliament
vote to review Karzai’s cabinet individually, rather than en bloc, significantly increasing
their leverage over Karzai’s nominees.  That perceived defeat prompted some to argue
that Karzai needs to develop a party structure to better organize his supporters.  However,
Karzai rallied his followers in the confirmation process; only five of his 25 cabinet
nominees (announced March 22, 2006) were rejected, fewer than expected.  (Three
ministers were declared confirmed after receiving plurality votes.)  Among those
confirmed was  Dr. Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, replacing the well known Northern Alliance
figure Dr. Abdullah.  Karzai’s one female nominee as well as his proposed culture
minister who had allowed distribution of Western-oriented films in Afghanistan were
rejected due to opposition from parliament conservatives.  The other three rejected were
the ministers of economy (a Karzai ally, rejected for perceived poor performance); of
commerce; and of transportation.  
